The Byrd Amendment Battle: American Trade Politics at the WTO by Hervey, Claire
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 27
Number 1 Fall 2003 Article 7
1-1-2003
The Byrd Amendment Battle: American Trade
Politics at the WTO
Claire Hervey
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Claire Hervey, The Byrd Amendment Battle: American Trade Politics at the WTO, 27 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 131 (2003).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol27/iss1/7
The Byrd Amendment Battle:
American Trade Politics at the WTO
By CLAIRE HERVEY*
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 20001
(CDSOA or the Byrd Amendment) has been controversial in both
domestic U.S. politics and in international trade law since its
enactment. In the United States, the controversy surrounds the
questionable method of its enactment. In the international sphere,
the controversy surrounds its validity under the world's strongest
supranational legal regime. While domestic legal challenges to the
Byrd Amendment have been fruitless, international litigation in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) has declared the act illegal under
international law. In the largest joint dispute resolution action in the
history of the WTO,2 thirty countries challenged the Byrd
Amendment as a violation of the ban on governmental subsidies, and
won. Despite its defeat, however, the Byrd Amendment remains in
force. The most important implication of the WTO decision,
therefore, is not the propriety of America's legislation but rather the
power of the WTO to act as an effective supranational legal
institution.'
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004. Ms.
Hervey is the former Director of Marketing and Communications for the State of
California's International Trade and Investment Division, prior to which she worked
at the World Bank and on numerous political campaigns. Ms. Hervey is Editor-in-
Chief of the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review; this article was
chosen for publication by a previous editorial board.
1. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (2002).
2. U.S. Trading Partners Welcome Bush Proposal to Rescind Byrd Amendment,
20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 6, at 255 (Feb. 6, 2003).
3. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003) at 1
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report]. The complaint was brought by eleven WTO
members: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Communities (representing
fifteen western European countries), India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, South Korea
and Thailand. Joining as third-parties were Argentina, Costa Rica, Hong Kong,
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The Byrd Amendment provides a novel approach to duties and
tariffs. A duty or tariff is essentially a tax placed on an import. The
rationale behind an antidumping or countervailing duty is to "level
the playing field" in the domestic market by guarding against unfair
or anticompetitive foreign trade practices which might lead to
"predatory" (i.e. monopoly-creating) trade practices.' The imposition
of a tariff prevents predatory practices by raising the artificially
depressed price of dumped or subsidized imported goods to reflect
"fair value," thereby protecting domestic companies. Hence the term
"protectionism" often refers to tariff-raising measures.
Under the Byrd Amendment, U.S. companies that file
antidumping petitions receive the duty proceeds from tariffs imposed
on foreign goods dumped in the U.S. market. Companies may also
petition for and receive the proceeds of countervailing duties imposed
on subsidized imports. Traditionally, this tariff revenue has been
directed to the U.S. Treasury's general fund. Under the Byrd
Amendment, however, the tariff revenue is only temporarily held by
the Treasury, before being redirected or channeled to the
complaining U.S. companies as an "offset" for "qualifying expenses."
The complainants in the WTO case argued that the Treasury's
distribution of tariff proceeds to domestic manufacturers seeking
protection from anticompetitive practices constitutes an
anticompetitive practice itself, by ostensibly subsidizing the domestic
industry. The Byrd Amendment is seen by its opponents as double
trade protection-a duty plus a subsidy-resulting in a retaliatory
imbalance in favor of U.S. industries.
The United States denied that CDSOA violated the WTO,
arguing that the distribution of money to affected domestic producers
was an "exercise of the intrinsic right of a WTO Member to provide
subsidies."5 The trigger for a company to receive funds under the law
was its status as an "affected domestic producer," the offset payments
being a restorative response to the producer's injury due to dumping
or subsidization.' This action was defended as materially distinctfrom the WTO-prohibited imposition of measures on the dumped or
Israel and Norway. The total number of complaining countries represented was
thirty. Id.
4. See generally STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN
TRADE POLICY 150-182 (2d ed. 2003)..
5. Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, 91 17.
6. Id.
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subsidized products themselves, or on the products" foreign producers
or exporters.7 The complainants disagreed with this characterization.
The WTO's Dispute Resolution Panel (the Panel) found for the
complainants in fall of 2002,8 and the United States appealed to the
WTO Appellate Body.9 On January 16, 2003, the Appellate Body
affirmed the core findings of the Panel, recommending that the
United States change or repeal the law in order to comply with its
WTO obligations.' ° An arbitration decision issued in June 2003
directed the United States to comply with this ruling by withdrawing
or amending the Byrd Amendment by December 27, 2003, or face
authorized retaliatory sanctions." The U.S. Congress has failed to
comply with the arbitral ruling (as well as with several other decisions
of the WTO), deepening the rift between America and its largest
trading partners during the important Doha Round negotiations, and
threatening the U.S. economy by creating the specter of authorized
economic retaliation in the billions of dollars.
Part One of this note will provide an overview of the applicable
trade laws and their rationale and of the dispute resolution procedure
in the WTO. Part Two will dissect the WTO's analysis and
adjudication of the matter and will discuss its legal and practical
effects. Part Three will trace CDSOA's controversial origin and
effects and examine the various political and economic consequences
of this decision in the United States.
I. "Unfair" Trade Practices and Their Legal Remedies
Trade barriers are controversial, but not universally disallowed.
In fact, the WTO allows countries to impose temporary import
restraints when certain products, imported under otherwise fair
conditions, enter the United States fast enough to cause, or threaten
7. Id. 16.
8. WTO Panel Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset
Act of 2000, WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R (Sept. 16, 2002).
9. Notification of an Appeal by the United States under Paragraph 4 of Article
16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU), United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000, WT/DS217/8,WT/DS234/16 (Oct. 22, 2002).
10. Appellate Body Report, supra note 3.
11. WTO Award of the Arbitrator, United States-Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)-Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU, WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22 (June 13, 2003).
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to cause, serious injury to a particular domestic industry. 2 This
"safeguard" or "escape-clause" mechanism allows specific domestic
companies or sectors a temporary period to adjust to the "fair"
foreign competition.13 However, this period of protection must be
limited in time (usually less than three years) and to certain
industries.'4
In response to "unfair" foreign competition, the rules are
different. Unfair competition usually takes the form of dumping or
subsidization.15
Dumping
Dumping occurs when the price of a good is lower in an export
market than in its home market.'6 In a normal market economy,
pricing is determined by the costs of production, allowing competition
on the basis of efficiency. Although dumping is often inadvertent
(due to exchange rate fluctuations or accounting practices), it may
also be purposeful. Intentional dumping may be permissible when it
is used in order to liquidate surplus or perishable inventory, or to
compensate for a domestic recession.'7 These cases are the result of
temporary market conditions, and therefore the dumping is short-
term and minimally injurious.
The dumping that is problematic is long-term in nature and
considered a "predatory" practice. Under this model, the exporter
lowers prices below cost in the U.S. market in order to increase
market share and eventually drive U.S. competitors out of business.1"
After obtaining a monopoly in the United States, the foreign dumper
drastically raises prices in the market to offset its dumping losses. To
guard against this possibility, the United States imposes antidumping
duties equal to the margin of dumping.
Foreign Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
A subsidy distorts an import's price by reducing the foreign
company's costs of production. This is considered an unfair trading
12. COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 154.
13. Id. at 154-156.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 161.
16. Id. at 162.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 163.
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practice because it disadvantages private firms that are trying to
compete on a non-subsidized basis. 9 The remedy for a foreign
subsidy is called a countervailing duty, and is determined by the
estimated impact the subsidy had on the product's price."
The Traditional Process for Determining and Remedying Unfair
Trade Practices in the United States
The Tariff Act of 1930 is the basis for U.S. trade remedy law,
seeking "the restoration of conditions of fair trade."'" It requires that
two conditions be met to trigger domestic protections. The first
requirement is the sale or potential sale of foreign goods in the
United States be at "less than fair value, 22 i.e., whether dumping or
subsidization, as determined by the U.S. Department of Commerce
(DOC) has occurred. Second, the dumping or subsidization must
cause potential or actual "material" injury to an existing or emerging
U.S. industry,23 as determined by the U.S. International Trade
Commission.
Upon the determination of a materially injurious dumping or
subsidization practice, the DOC ascertains the "margin" of dumping
or subsidization-usually the difference between a product's normal
value in its home market (or without subsidization) and its sale price
in the United States.2" This marginal price is applied to the product as
a tariff. The proceeds of the tariff are paid to the U.S. Treasury, and
the foreign producer consequently has a higher cost basis, and hence
must sell at a more competitive price.
The Byrd Amendment
CDSOA made an important procedural change to the Tariff Act
19. Id. at 170.
20. Id. at 171.
21. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1681b (1999 & Supp. 2001). Other trade
remedy statutes do exist, but are not relevant to this analysis. The Anti-Dumping
Act of 1916 was declared illegal by the WTO in 2000, but the United States has yet to
repeal the statute. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 allows the
U.S. Trade Representative to initiate actions in other countries, and is not relevant
here.
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1).
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2).
24. For a more complete explanation of the mechanics of margin valuation, see
Daniel M. Lopez, The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000: 'Relief
for the U.S. Steel Industry; Trouble for the United States in the WTO, 23 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 415,416-19 (2002).
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of 1930. CDSOA states: "Duties assessed pursuant to a countervailing
duty order, [or] an antidumping duty order.., shall be distributed on
an annual basis under this section to the affected domestic producers
for qualifying expenditures. Such distribution shall be known as the
'continued dumping and subsidy offset. ' ' 25
"Affected domestic producers" are any businesses, farmers, or
union members who petition for an antidumping or countervailing
duty against a foreign producer.26 "Qualifying expenditures" are any
essentially legitimate business expenses incurred by the producer
after filing the petition.27 Administratively, the duties are collected by
the Customs Service and deposited into the U.S. Treasury's Offset
Account. Organizations that file petitions are then allocated the
monies after the close of the fiscal year. Offset payments are
distributed in proportion to the claimed qualifying expenditures,
meaning that larger companies usually get a larger share.28 Despite
original congressional forecasts of $39 million in annual
disbursements, $231 million were disbursed in 2001.29 In 2002, the
disbursements increased to $329 million.3°
WTO Dispute Resolution Procedures
The WTO established a binding dispute resolution procedure
under the Uruguay Round in 1994.31 Under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), a member country that believes another
country's trade policies violate the terms of the WTO may seek
resolution in three successive ways. First, the parties are encouraged
to resolve their differences by consultation or negotiation.
Approximately one-half of all disputes are resolved at this stage." If
this process does not succeed in settling the matter, then the dispute is
submitted to a Dispute Resolution Panel of three to five members.33
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Neil King, Jr., Trade Imbalance: Why Uncle Sam Wrote a Big Check To a
Sparkler Maker, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2002, at Al.
29. 2001 U.S. CUSTOMs ANN. REP., CDSOA FY 2001 Disbursements, available at
<www.customs.gov>.
30. Id.
31. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
32. COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 190.
33. Id.
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The decision of the Panel is automatically binding, but issues of law
may be appealed to the Appellate Body, which is the final arbiter of
the dispute.m A decision of the Appellate Body is final and binding,
and a decision by it against a member must be implemented within a
"reasonable period of time" or else the member will face authorized
trade retaliation.35
II. CDSOA at the WTO
The case against CDSOA represented the largest number of
complainants for any WTO case,36 with eleven complaining parties
(Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Communities, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico and Thailand) and five third-party
participants (Argentina, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel and
Norway).37 Together, the fifteen parties represent thirty countries,38
twenty-seven of which are among the top fifty trading partners of the
United States.39
Suit at WTO Dispute Resolution Panel
Immediately following the Byrd Amendment's passage, many of
America's largest trading partners began proceedings to challenge the
law at the WTO. The complaining parties argued that CDSOA
violated seven different antidumping, subsidy and countervailing duty
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). '
The United States is a party to the WTO and its governing
treaty, the GATT. 1 GATT Article VI is the primary provision
relating to antidumping and countervailing duties.42 Supplementing
and clarifying Article VI are two important agreements: the
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See U.S. Trading Partners Welcome Bush Proposal to Rescind Byrd
Amendment, supra note 2.
37. Appellate Body Report, supra note 3.
38. The "European Communities" represents the 15 countries of the European
Union-Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
39. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Top 50 Partners in Total U.S. Trade in 2001,
available at <www.export.gov/tradestatistics.html> (visited Nov. 19, 2003).
40. Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, % 4.
41. W'TO Agreement, supra note 31. Done at Marrakesh April 15, 1994; entered
into force January 1, 1995.
42. Lopez, supra note 24, at 415, 420.
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Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT (Anti-
Dumping Agreement or ADA) and the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM). Both of these agreements are part
of the GATT and have the same binding force.
The ADA states: "No specific action against dumping of exports
from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the
provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Agreement. 4 3 The
SCM reads: "No specific action against a subsidy of another Member
can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994,
as interpreted by this Agreement."'  Except for the references to
dumping or subsidization, the articles are the same. Indeed, even the
footnotes to each of these provisions are identical: "This paragraph is
not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of
GATT 1994, where appropriate.,
5
The complaining parties challenged the Byrd Amendment
primarily on the ground that it violated the ADA and SCM as a "non-
permissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy. 4 6 Four
other, related issues were specifically raised at the Appellate Body: 1)
whether the United States acted in good faith in enacting CDSOA; 47 2)
whether CDSOA violates the WTO Agreement;48 3) whether CDSOA
"nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to the complaining parties"; 49
and 4) whether the United States should have received a separate
Dispute Resolution Panel report on the claim brought by Mexico."
Issues 2 and 3 on appeal are inextricably tied to the primary
claim, in that if CDSOA violates ADA and SCM, then it by definition
also violates the WTO Agreement and nullifies or impairs benefits.
Therefore, these three items will be examined together, under the
aegis of the ADA/SCM issue. Issue 4 on appeal, the right to a
separate Mexico report, is resolved as an essentially temporal and
practical consideration and will not be discussed here, except to say
that the Appellate Body did not find the separate report necessary.
43. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 18.1 [hereinafter ADA].
44. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, GATT 1994, H.R.
Doc. No. 316, vol. 1, at 1533, art. 32.1 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
45. Id. at 1533, n. 56; King, supra note 28.
46. Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, 223(a).
47. Id. 223(b).
48. Id. 223(c).
49. Id. 223(d).
50. Id. 223(e).
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Issue 1, the good faith issue, is the only portion of the Panel Report
that was overturned on appeal, and is explored below.
CDSOA's Violation of WTO, ADA and SCM
This case involves the status of a domestic U.S. law under
international treaties. The core issue is whether CDSOA is an
"impermissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy" violating
the ADA and the SCM, and by extension violating the WTO
agreement and nullifying and impairing benefits entitled to countries
seeking to enter the U.S. market.
The Appellate Body textually analyzed each part of the phrase
"impermissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy,"
developing a three-step standard to determine this issue. The three
steps, or prongs, are "Specific Action," "Adverse Bearing," and
"Permissibility."
The Appellate Body defined the first prong, Specific Action, as
"a measure ... taken only in situations presenting the constituent
elements of dumping or a subsidy."51 The second prong, Adverse
Bearing, determined the meaning of the clause "acts 'against'
dumping or a subsidy," defining it as a measure that "has an adverse
bearing on the practice[s] of dumping or... subsidization. 5 2 Both of
these prongs are necessary, but not sufficient, elements for a finding
of a WTO violation.
Finally, if it was determined that CDSOA was both a specific
action and had an adverse bearing, then the Panel had to consider
whether the act was permissible, i.e., fit under any exceptions to the
ADA and SCM. Some specific acts against dumping or subsidies are
allowed under the WTO. These exceptions include definitive
antidumping or countervailing duties, provisional measures and
undertakings, and in the case of subsidies, countermeasures. 3
Therefore the final Permissibility prong determines whether CDSOA
falls within one of these exceptions. If it does not fall within an
exception, then it is impermissible, failing the third prong and
violating the WTO.
51. Id. 227.
52. Id.
53. Id. 231. See also ADA, supra note 43; SCM Agreement, supra note 44.
20031
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The Specific Action Prong
The complaining parties argued that the term "specific action" as
used in the phrase "specific action against dumping" (or against a
subsidy), should be interpreted using the test established by the
Appellate Body in the US-I916 Act case." In that case, a U.S. law
that ostensibly only targeted "predatory pricing" was found to be
inconsistent with GATT as a specific action against dumping because
the remedial actions were taken in response to any dumping or a
subsidy, not just a predatory pricing practice.5 The Appellate Body
reasoned that the remedy was specifically and exclusively linked to
the determination of dumping or a subsidy, as evidenced by the text
of the law.
5 6
The United States argued that unlike the 1916 Act, CDSOA's text
did not explicitly refer to the constituent elements of dumping or a
subsidy, nor did the determination of dumping or a subsidy trigger
application of the law.57
The Appellate Body dismissed the U.S. argument, concluding
that the test for specificity does not require the explicit use of the
constituent elements in the text of the act. The test asks if the
constituent elements are present, either explicitly or implicitly, as a
specifically necessary condition for taking action under the act. 8
Thus, a specific action is a measure taken only in response to a
dumping or subsidy finding. Although it is not explicit in the text of
the Byrd Amendment, a dumping or subsidy finding is absolutely
necessary for CDSOA to be applied.
The United States further argued that if this definition for
"specific action" were used, then any expenditure of the duties, such
as for international emergency relief, would be considered a specific
action against dumping or a subsidy. 9 The Appellate Body again
disagreed with the United States, determining that though the
specificity requirement was necessary for an adverse finding on the
law, it was nonetheless insufficient. The specific action must also be
"against" dumping or a subsidy. International emergency relief
54. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS136/AB/R (Sept. 26,2000).
55. Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, 239.
56. Id.
57. Id. 243.
58. Id. 244.
59. Id. 245.
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would have absolutely no effect on other countries' dumping or
subsidy practices, and therefore could not operate "against" dumping
or a subsidy.60 This distinction brought the court to the next analytical
prong: adverse bearing.
The Adverse Bearing Prong
The term "against" as used in the phrase "specific action against
dumping" or a subsidy, was interpreted by the Appellate Body to
mean "having an adverse bearing" on dumping or subsidization
practices.61
Relying on the Oxford English Dictionary, the United States
argued that the meaning of "against" should include "in contact
with."62 This would have supported the U.S. case because the CDSOA
duties do not "operate directly" on the imported good or its producer,
but instead on the "practice of dumping,"'63 and because the funds
were indirectly channeled back to the petitioning domestic producers,
not directly transferred from the foreign company to the domestic
petitioner. '  The Appellate Body found that definition to be
inappropriate and irrelevant, as it referred to physical contact and not
the idea of opposition, which was the plain meaning of the word in
the trade context.65
Instead, the Appellate Body ruled that the "against" test should
focus on whether a measure undermines the practice of dumping or
subsidization, as the ADA and SCM pose no requirement that the
measure act against the product or its manufacturer.6 The Appellate
Body ruled that in determining whether CDSOA was against dumping
or subsidization, "it is necessary to assess whether the design and
structure of a measure is such that the measure is 'opposed to', has an
adverse bearing on, or, more specifically, has the effect of dissuading
the practice of dumping or the practice of subsidization, or creates an
incentive to terminate such practices.
6 7
Four elements of the Byrd Amendment's design and structure
60. Id.
61. Id. 247.
62. Id.
63. Id. 251.
64. Id. 247.
65. Id. 248.
66. Id. T 253.
67. Id. 254.
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demonstrate that its effect is to transfer money from foreign
producers of dumped or subsidized goods to their American
competitors: the offset payments are financed from the duties paid by
the foreign producers; the "affected domestic producers" who
receive offset payments are necessarily competitors of the duty-
paying foreign producers;69 the "qualifying expenditures" for which
domestic producers are ostensibly reimbursed must be related to the
production of the competitive product; 7' and finally, there are no
requirements as to how an offset payment is to be spent.7'
These four elements show that CDSOA has an adverse bearing
on foreign exporters by not only subjecting them to antidumping or
countervailing duties, but also by forcing them to finance their own
competitors, thereby creating a double penalty for exporting dumped
or subsidized products. For these reasons, the Appellate Body ruled
that CDSOA was "undoubtedly" an action "against" dumping or a
subsidy.7 Having satisfied the necessary Specific Action and Adverse
Bearing prongs, the analysis continued to the final consideration of
whether the Byrd Amendment would fit into a permissible exception
under the WTO.
The Permissibility Prong
In order to be permissible, a specific action against dumping or a
subsidy must be in accordance with the WTO agreement. That is, it
must be among the permissible responses considered in GATT 1994
as interpreted by the ADA or the SCM,74 and it may only constitute
one form of relief.
75
Under the rationale of US-1916 Act, WTO-permissible responses
to dumping are definitive antidumping duties, provisional measures
and price undertakings.76 Similarly, the permissible responses to a
countervailable subsidy are definitive countervailing duties,
provisional measures, price undertakings and multilaterally-
68. Id. 255.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. 256.
73. Id.
74. Id. 263.
75. Id. 270.
76. Id. % 265.
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sanctioned countermeasures under the dispute settlement system.77
In any case, the invoking party may only apply one remedy. 78
The U.S. argued that because the US-1916 Act decision only
referred to dumping, and because of certain textual differences
between the agreements, the ADA rationale should not be extended
to subsidies.79 The Appellate Body dismissed this argument, noting
that the structure of the ADA and the SCM were identical and should
be treated similarly.'
CDSOA's payments to affected producers fit none of the WTO-
sanctioned categories. Although the duties imposed on the foreign
dumped or subsidized products are independently allowable under
the WTO, the affiliated offset payments to domestic competitors do
not fit any permissible category. Moreover, if they were permissible,
they would still constitute a double-remedy, and hence, violate the
WTO limit of one form of relief.
The Byrd Amendment was therefore found to be an
impermissible specific action against dumping or a subsidy,8" and the
Appellate Body recommended that the United States bring the Byrd
Amendment into conformity with its obligations under WTO, ADA
and SCM.'
Financial Incentive/Bad Faith Determination Overturned
The Dispute Resolution Panel noted in its report that the Byrd
Amendment "provides a financial incentive for domestic producers to
file or support applications.., because offset payments are made
only to producers that file or support such applications."83 The Panel
determined that this violated ADA Article 5.4 and SCM Article 11.4.
These provisions require that antidumping or countervailing duty
investigations only be initiated when an application is supported by
producers accounting for more than 25 percent of domestic
production.' 4 The purpose of these rules is to ensure that the claim of
injury is a legitimate industry-wide concern, not just an
77. Id. 269.
78. Id. 270.
79. Id. 267.
80. Id. 268.
81. Id. 318(a).
82. Id. 9[ 319.
83. Id. 277.
84. Id. 281.
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unsubstantiated attempt by an unrepresentative minority to get
protection.85
The Panel ruled that domestic producers' motivation to support
a petition was relevant to whether the petition was legitimately made
on behalf of an entire industry.' The Panel found that the Byrd
Amendment inappropriately encouraged producers to support a
petition to ensure that they received a share of the spoils, rather than
because of a commercial threat of unfairly traded products.87 The
Byrd Amendment's petition policy promotes specific action by
companies, which is different from protecting an entire industry from
an unfair trade threat. When only petitioning companies receive
offset payments, they obtain a competitive advantage over non-
petitioning domestic companies, as a kind of selective subsidy. This
encourages all domestic producers of a petitioned product to support
the petition, so as not to be at a competitive disadvantage if and when
offset payments are doled out.
If an antidumping or countervailing duty is raised on imports,
then the entire domestic industry benefits from higher barriers to
competition. However, if monies are disbursed based on specific
protesting companies, then the squeaky wheels are the only ones to
receive grease.
As an example, consider F, a foreign producer of widgets, and X
and Y, domestic producers of widgets. Assume that an Fwidget's
home country value is $10. F is dumping Fwidgets in the United
States at $1 less than its home country value ($10 - $1 = $9). This
creates a margin of dumping of $1 per Fwidget. X petitions the
government for an antidumping duty against F. Y does not support
the petition. The United States imposes a $1 per Fwidget
antidumping duty, which is paid by F to customs ($9 + $1 = $10). If
100 widgets enter the United States, F will pay $100 in antidumping
duties. X and Y will both benefit because their products now
compete with a more expensive (i.e. "fairly priced") foreign product.
Under the Byrd Amendment, X, as the only petitioner, will also
receive $100, reducing X's costs of production by $100 and thereby
lowering the price of Xwidgets. Y, though benefited by the higher-
priced Fwidgets, is nonetheless disadvantaged by having to compete
with lower priced Xwidgets. If both X and Y join the petition
85. Id. 279.
86. Id.
87. Id. J 277.
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(assuming they have equal market share) the $100 will be distributed
$50 to X and $50 to Y, equally reducing their production costs, and
creating no domestic advantages. The prudent company will
therefore always join a petition, so that it can share the offsets. The
Panel determined that this financial incentive to support petitions
violated the purpose and intent of the ADA and SCM, concluding
that the United States did not act in good faith when enacting the
amendment.'
Table: Effect of Byrd Amendment on Widget Price
Trade Market Price of Widgets in
Regime U.S.
(Assume a widget F X Y
cost of $10) dumping foreign domestic domestic
producer producer producer
No Trade Rules $9 $10 $10
WTO Trade Law + $1 = $10 $10 $10
Byrd Amendment: + $1 = $10 -$1= $9 $10
only X petitions
Byrd Amendment: + $1 = $10 -$.50 = $9.50 -$.50 = $9.50
both X and Y petition
The Appellate Body overruled the Panel on this motive issue,
declaring that the degree of support, and not its nature, was at issue."
The Appellate Body further ruled that while good faith was relevant,
the mere violation of a substantive treaty provision was insufficient
evidence to prove bad faith.9
III. The Political and Historical Context
Distinguishing free traders from protectionists is hard to do
88. Id. 295.
89. Id. 283.
90. Id. T 298.
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based on partisan, regional, or ethnic lines. The debate between the
two factions invariably revolves around issues of equity and
economics. In the end, however, a great deal of U.S. trade policy-
and the Byrd Amendment in particular-does nothing to further the
goals of equity or efficiency. In fact, the Byrd Amendment is just one
example of America's long line of politically-motivated trade
provisions. Though trade laws are presented with a veneer of
economic or equity rationale, the true secret of their success is in the
naked electoral politicking of the American officials who vote or sign
these pieces of legislation. Despite the Washington maxim that
"[t]rade issues are to be kept on the back burner in election years,""
even-numbered and especially presidential election years provide
particularly fertile ground for interest groups on both sides of the
debate to lobby their narrow positions, distorting the economic and
equity considerations. In the past, these interest groups had
everything to gain and nothing to lose by lobbying for these trade
preferences in exchange for votes. However, the WTO's dispute
resolution process and clever tactical decisions by affected trade
partners (especially Europe) may allow politicians to insulate
themselves from interest group pressure, repeal the Byrd
Amendment and other WTO-inconsistent laws, and preserve the
WTO.
Legislative History: Pork-Barrel Politics
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 was
enacted as a part of the Agriculture Appropriations bill,92 passed by
Congress and signed by President Clinton just prior to the 2000
presidential election. Its passage was a result of questionable
parliamentary practices by the dean of the Senate, West Virginia
Senator Robert Byrd. Inserted into the bill at the eleventh-hour of
conference negotiations, the Byrd Amendment never received
committee consideration in either house.93 Indeed:
Mr. Byrd secured passage of the provision.., by attaching it to the
conference report of a $70 billion agriculture appropriations bill
91. Bruce Stokes, Will Hot Trade Issues Scald GOP?, NAT'L J., January 3, 2004.
92. The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies Administration Act, H.R. 4461, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
93. WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TRADE REMEDY LAW
REFORM IN THE 107TH CONGRESS, <www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRS/> (visited Oct. 2,
2003).
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through deft after-hours parliamentary maneuvering. After several
Republicans left the conference committee room, Mr. Byrd
whisked it through by a one-vote margin. After an effort by
committee chairmen, the House leadership and the Clinton
administration to excise the Byrd amendment from the bill, it
became law with President Clinton's signature.94
In his signature statement, President Clinton urged the 106th
Congress "to override this provision [the Byrd Amendment], or
amend it to be acceptable" before Congress adjourned for the year.95
The President's statement noted that the provision would provide
select U.S. industries with a subsidy above and beyond the protection
level needed to counteract foreign subsidies, while providing no
comparable subsidy to other U.S. industries or U.S. consumers, who
are forced to pay higher prices on industrial inputs or consumer goods
as a result of the antidumping and countervailing duties. 96
Senator Byrd was at that time the Chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, the largest committee in the Senate.' It
is also one of the most powerful, as it is constitutionally mandated to
write the laws that allocate federal funds (together with the House
Appropriations Committee).98  Senator Byrd has sat on this
committee since 1959, and is the longest-serving member of the
Senate (eight consecutive terms),99 making him one of the most
powerful players in the Capitol. Byrd has wielded his power grandly,
championing the filibuster and funneling billions of federal funds to
94. Carter Dougherty, WTO Decides U.S. Law Violates Trade Treaties, WASH.
TIMES, July 18,2002, at C8.
95. Statement of President Clinton: The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food
and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 4461,
(2000).
96. Id.
97. United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, at
<www.senate.gov/-appropriations/jurisdiction/jurisdiction.htm> (visited Oct. 2,
2003).
98. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 9 states: "No money shall be drawn from the treasury,
but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and
account of receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time
to time." U.S. Const. art. 1, § 7, cl. 1 states: "All bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur
with the Amendments as on other bills." U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8 states: "The Congress
shall have power to lay and collect.., duties... [and] to regulate commerce with
foreign nations."
99. United States Senate, website of Senator Robert Byrd, available at
<www.senate.gov/-byrd/intro.htm> (visited Oct. 1, 2003).
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his small state. Byrd has made no secret of his pork-barrel politics,
famously declaring "I want to be West Virginia's billion-dollar
industry."1" Byrd zealously supports West Virginia's steel
manufacturing companies and jobs through protectionist trade
policies and industry supports.
CDSOA was unquestionably an example of Byrd's political skill
and intense focus on his constituents' interests, regardless of
procedural propriety, international legality or economic soundness.
By introducing this spending amendment in conference committee,
Byrd violated the Congressional procedure rules that spending bills
be considered by each body's appropriate committee of expertise
before going to conference. In the case of a trade remedy law, the
Senate Finance Committee is the committee of jurisdiction. The
Finance Committee chairman, Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa),
has said that he is "not surprised that a bill that was never considered
by the committee of expertise or even the full Senate is found to
violate our international commitments. That's why we have
committees-to make sure things like this don't happen." 102
Byrd's agenda has long included protection of West Virginia's
steel and coal industries.'03 CDSOA was designed to assist domestic
steel producers, and almost half of the antidumping or countervailing
duties cases covered by the amendment relate to steel." This design
proved effective, as "[m]ore than 2,000 American companies are in
line to receive fines levied under the Byrd agreement, and 46 percent
of those companies that have won dumping complaints are steel
100. Francis X. Clines, How Do West Virginians Spell Pork? It's B-Y-R-D, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2002, at Al.
101. See Senator Byrd's website <www.byrd.senate.gov> for a declaration of this
support in his own words.
102. Daniel Pruzin & Gary Yerkey, Appellate Panel Upholds WTO Decision
Against Byrd Amendment; EU Seeks Repeal, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 4, at
188 (Jan. 23, 2003). See also Press Release, Senator Charles Grassley, World Trade
Organization Ruling on U.S. Dumping Fines (Jan. 16, 2003), available at
<www.grassley.senate.gov/releases/2003/pO3rOt-16g.htm>.
103. The coal and steel industries are intimately linked, as "[c]oal comprises sixty
percent of the energy used to produce steel." Heather A. Steinmiller, Steel Industry
Watch Out! The Kyoto Protocol is Lurking, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 161,166-67 (2000).
104. Naomi Koppel, WTO to Look into Byrd Amendment: WTO Investigates
Legality of Controversial Byrd Amendment, Which Exporters Say Is Punitive,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 24, 2001), available at <www.pnltv.com/
NewsStories/Aug%2024%20WTO%20to%2OLook%20into%2OByrd%
20Amendment.htm> (visited Oct. 1, 2003).
[Vol. 27:131
The Byrd Amendment Battle at the WTO
firms."' ' Byrd is not alone in the Congress as a steel advocate-both
houses boast of an influential, bipartisan "Steel Caucus." The
House's caucus includes 110 members representing districts with steel
manufacturers.1°6 The Senate's Steel Caucus is powerful enough to
have attracted the signatures of sixty-eight senators (a veto-proof
number) on a letter to President Bush, urging him to enforce the
Byrd Amendment, even after its two-time defeat at the WTO. 7 The
Byrd Amendment has impacted a wide swath of industries, though,
not just steel; in fact the Amendments effects can be seen most clearly
in unrelated industries such as sparklers, mushroom canning and
candle making.
The Reality of the Byrd Amendment-Some Perverse Anecdotes
The perverse incentive of the Byrd Amendment is that it
encourages non-competitive U.S. companies to remain in, or even
enter, the market. Some U.S. companies, driven out of the market by
foreign competition, reestablished themselves and began producing
again in order to benefit from the offset payments. Certain industries
gained widespread publicity for this perversity in the months
following the first disbursements in 2001.
Diamond Sparkler is one company that has benefited from the
Byrd Amendment." Located in Youngstown, Ohio, Diamond was
the only remaining sparkler manufacturer in the United States in
2001, all the others having been driven out of business by foreign
competition."° China, the world's largest sparkler producing nation,
had been found by the ITC and DOC to be dumping sparklers in the
United States at below cost. The government responded by imposing
a ninety-four percent tariff on the Chinese sparklers." ° Despite the
105. Emma Jane Kirby, U.S. Trade Policy Sparks Complaint, BBC WORLD NEWS,
available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/1455448.stm> (visited Oct. 1, 2003).
106. Press Release, Congressman Phil English, English Selected to Chair
Congressional Steel Caucus (Mar. 23, 2001), available at
<www.house.gov/english/press200l/steelcaucus032201.htm> (visited Oct. 1, 2003).
107. Press Release, Senator Robert Byrd, Senators Urge Bush to Preserve Byrd
Amendment (Feb. 4, 2003), available at <www.senate.gov/-byrd/
byrd-newsroom/byrdnews-feb/bryd-newsfeb.html> (visited Oct. 1, 2003).
108. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 16, 2003),
available at 2003 Westlaw 5577743 thereinafter All Things Considered].
109. Fight Brewing for Law Giving U.S. Companies Foreign Money, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (May 29, 2001), available at <http://enquirer.com/
editions/2001/05/29/fin-fight brews-over.html> (visited Oct. 1, 2003).
110. Id.
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tariff, Chinese sparklers remained cheaper in the U.S. market than
Diamond's."1 ' After the passage of the Byrd Amendment, Diamond
applied for an offset. For 2001, Diamond received $1.6 million,
allowing it to operate at a profit for the first time in years.1 2 In fiscal
year 2002, Diamond received $291,230 in offset payments."' The
decrease in offset payments was due to lower imports of sparklers (in
response to the Amendment's tariff-based price rise) and because
Diamond had to share the offset proceeds with a new and former
domestic competitor-Elkton.
The Elkton Sparkler Company is a Maryland manufacturer that
had been driven out of business in 1999. For the next two years,
Elkton ceased production, imported the cheaper Chinese sparklers
and focused on reselling in the U.S. market. After the 2001
disbursements, Elkton realized its once-smaller competitor Diamond
was now operating at a greater profit due to the Byrd Amendment's
offset payments. Consequently, Elkton resumed operations,' and for
fiscal year 2002, Elkton received $604,541 in offset payments from the
federal government."5
The tiny sparkler industry is just one example of the way in
which the Byrd Amendment operates in the real world. Other
beneficiaries in fiscal year 2002 included the crawfish industry ($7.4
million in offset payments), canned mushroom companies ($3.2
million), candle makers ($69.5 million), pencil manufacturers ($2.7
million), and most impressively, ball bearings producers ($125.4
million). 16 Steel interests were well represented as petitioners, but
steel imports did not garner the lion's share of tariff income under
CDSOA, due to a drop in imported steel as a response to the Byrd
Amendment and a number of other domestic trade practices aimed at
limiting foreign steel, most notably President Bush's 30 percent tariff
on steel imposed in March 2002.
The Domestic and International Battle Ahead
The Byrd Amendment is not good for America. Its economic
benefits distort our free market system; its intended boon to the steel
111. Id.
112. All Things Considered, supra note 108.
113. 2002 U.S. CUSTOMS ANN. REP., available at <www.customs.gov>.
114. See King, supra note 28.
115. 2002 U.S. CUSTOMs ANN. REP., supra note 113.
116. Id.
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industry has not, and will not, materialize; and it has created a
precarious relationship with our closest allies and trading partners.
While the United States formally lost the case at the WTO, the Byrd
Amendment's defeat is actually a win for America's competitive free-
market paradigm, its overall industrial and employment concerns and
hopefully for its diplomatic and trade relationships with its closest
allies.
After battling the Byrd Amendment for more than two years, the
complaining parties and free-trade advocates everywhere seemingly
had cause to rejoice over the Appellate Body's ruling. The Appellate
Body, from which no appeal is available, is, after all, the final arbiter
of trade disputes under the WTO. Under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding-the greatest achievement of the Uruguay Round
negotiations-the case was closed: America had to comply and repeal
the Byrd Amendment. Or so one might have thought.
In fact, one might say the battle is only half over. The legal
battle was perhaps the easy part. The Byrd Amendment was doomed
from the beginning at the WTO-President Clinton admitted as much
when signing the bill. But it remains a powerful political tool for both
the Congress and for America's trading partners.
The Domestic Response
Within a week of the Appellate Body Report's formal adoption
by the WTO, the new political battle began. The trade battle, though,
is fought by bizarre coalitions. If politics makes strange bedfellows,
then trade politics is an orgy of the bizarre. America's Republican
president announced that he would seek the Byrd Amendment's
repeal; the Republican Congress dared him to try. Democratic
Senator Byrd collected sixty-eight bipartisan senate signatures on a
letter to the president asking him to reverse his position and support
the amendment.
Although there are specific, vested corporate and labor interests
which support protectionist trade policies, there are also many
constituencies which benefit from the liberalized trade policies that
the WTO promotes. By protecting the domestic steel industry, steel
production jobs may be preserved in Ohio, Pennsylvania and West
Virginia. However, the increased prices will negatively impact steel-
consuming industries, which will pay a higher price. Steel-consuming
industries such as car makers, aerospace and construction make up a
much larger share of the national employment and are distributed
2003]
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among every state in the union.1 7 A recent study claims that "[m]ore
American workers lost their jobs to higher steel prices in 2002 than
the total number employed by the U.S. steel industry itself."18
Steel-consuming industries are not discrete and insular in the
same way as the steel-producing industry. For this reason, the
consuming industries have a more difficult lobbying challenge to
protect their economic interests. The Congress has a difficult time
making liberal trade policy choices because of the lobbying disparities
between these two groups. The executive branch has an equally hard
row to hoe because steel states are typically partisan battlegrounds-
where the difference in trade rhetoric can win or lose a national
election. For this reason, liberal trade policies need to be somewhat
politically insulated in order to prevail. Two ways to politically
insulate the debate are to take it to the judicial branch, and to
scapegoat internationally binding rules.
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, WTO judgments are not
automatically enforceable; though, ironically, protectionists have long
sounded the battle cry of "lost sovereignty" '' when it comes to the
WTO. Seemingly, then, one way to avoid the sovereignty problem is
to litigate this matter in the U.S. courts. However, the Byrd
Amendment was challenged domestically, to no avail. In the case of
Pacific Giant, Inc. v. United States,' decided at the U.S. Court of
International Trade in August 2002, the Byrd Amendment was
challenged by a Chinese crawfish exporter as a violation of due
process rights. Pacific Giant argued that the transfer of funds from
the foreign producer to its domestic competitor was a punitive
measure, but the court disagreed, saying that "imposition of duties
does not constitute the exclusive means of remediation, and Congress
has exercised its constitutional powers in choosing to further the goal
of remediation through the distribution of collected duties to parties
affected by dumping."''
117. See, e.g., Joseph Francois & Laura M. Baughman, The Unintended
Consequences of U.S. Steel Import Tariffs: A Quantification of the Impact During
2002, Feb. 7, 2003, Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition, available at
<http://www.citac.info/study/citac_2002jobstudy-020703.pdf>.
118. Id. at 2.
119. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States
Acceptance and Implementation of Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 157 (1997); Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty, Influence, Realpolitik and
the World Trade Organization, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 341 (2002).
120. Pac. Giant Inc. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002).
121. Id. at 1348-49.
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Perhaps a reconsideration of this case, on appeal, would allow
the federal circuit court to apply the appropriate international law as
established by the WTO's appellate body. Under our constitution, a
treaty (such as the WTO/GATT) has the same legal status as a
domestic statute, so the "later in time" rule would apply-making the
Byrd Amendment valid. However, if it were found to be
unconstitutional on appeal, or if the federal circuit court chose to
apply the WTO's decision as binding on U.S. courts, the Byrd
Amendment could be enjoined from enforcement, providing a
solution to the controversy.
The Foreign Response
At the same time that the domestic branches are battling it out,
America's closest allies and trading partners have a hand to play. The
Doha Round negotiations on changes to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding are underway, and within a week of the CDSOA
ruling, Canada circulated a proposal for refunds of Byrd Amendment
duties.22 WTO officials have expressed "increasing concern" that the
United States will not be able to comply with the Byrd Amendment
ruling, as it is one of several unenforced adverse rulings by the WTO
against America."3 EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy has made a
public appeal to America to "play by the rules" and comply
immediately.124 He correctly notes that "noncompliance weakens a
system which enforces [America's] own rights. If we, the elephants of
world trade, don't follow the rules of the road, we weaken our ability
to get others to do so.
''
025
In the spring of 2003, the United States and the complaining
parties entered into WTO arbitration regarding the timetable and
form of implementation of the ruling.126 The parties disagreed on
what constituted a "reasonable period of time" for implementation-
122. Daniel Pruzin, Canada Urges Refund of Illegal Duties as Part of WTO Reform
of AD/CV Rules, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 6, at 264 (Feb. 6, 2003).
123. Rossella Brevetti, WTO Official Cites Rising Concern With U.S.' Ability to
Comply With Adverse WTO Rulings, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 7, at 303 (Feb.
13, 2003).
124. Pascal Lamy, Come on America, Play by the Rules!, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,
2003, at A16.
125. Id.
126. Award of the Arbitrator, United States-Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)-
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22 (June 13,
2003).
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the United States sought a fifteen-month period, whereas the
complainants sought a six-month time period, dating from the
decision of the Appellate Body on January 27, 2003. The United
States argued that because it was a legislative matter, additional time
was needed to process the change through America's constitutionally
mandated procedures of bicameralism and presentment. The
complaining parties argued that "prompt compliance" was required
under the DSU, and that delay of implementation beyond the end of
the U.S. fiscal year (September 30, 2003) would irreparably harm the
parties because annual disbursements are scheduled to occur within
60 days of the end of the fiscal year. The parties also disagreed on
what constituted the appropriate type of implementation-a full
repeal of the Byrd Amendment, or just an amendment to its offset
distribution section. The arbitrator ruled that the form of compliance
was up to the United States, but no matter what its form-repeal or
modification-compliance was to be made by December 27, 2003.
The deadline came and went; nothing changed.'1
7
Other WTO verdicts against the United States have yet to be
enforced-legal reform has been demanded of the Anti-Dumping Act
of 1916, the Copyright/Music Licensing Case and the Extraterritorial
Income Tax Exclusion Act (the successor to the Foreign Sales
Corporations Act).' The growing number of unenforced rulings
against the United States creates a worrisome and uncertain future
for the WTO and for the United States in the world trading system.
A recent $4 billion judgment against the United States by the EU has
yet to be enforced, pending the Congress's consideration of repeal of
the Foreign Sales Corporation Act. If compliance does not
materialize soon, the EU has threatened to use retaliatory trade
sanctions. Such sanctions would have disastrous and far-reaching
effects on the U.S. economy, which counts the EU bloc as its largest
trading partner. It could also have a negative effect on America's
attempt to gain support for its overseas anti-terror efforts.
But these macro issues of the global economy, trade relations
and foreign security relations do not figure into the voting calculus of
the average American voter. Pocketbook issues, especially
employment and wages, are paramount to most voters. Protectionists
127. U.S. Lets Pass WTO Deadline to End Tariffs, L.A. TIMES, December 30, 2003
at B3; Jeffrey Sparshott, EU Aims Payback at U.S. Trade Law, WASH. TIMES,
December 20, 2003 at Cl.
128. Lamy, supra note 124.
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have garnered support by insisting that free trade has led to fewer
U.S. jobs, and that protectionism will solve the high unemployment
faced in many of the swing states by reducing demand for imports and
"bringing home" the jobs. Free traders have insisted that liberalized
trade policy reduces prices, and promotes higher wage jobs. But in
states where unemployment is high, and many manufacturing jobs
have been lost over the last few decades, voters are more focused on
merely having jobs, making the protectionist message much more
politically powerful. Elected officials are more likely to follow this
tack, then, in order to provide for their constituencies and stay in
power.
Under WTO rules, Europe has deftly figured out a way to make
U.S. communities internalize the free trade-protectionist choice. The
WTO-authorized retaliatory trade measures, for non-compliance with
an appellate body ruling, will be directed at the specific states and
specific industries that are most prone to this protectionist voting."9
For example, beginning March 1, 2004, the EU will impose retaliatory
tariffs on the politically sensitive U.S. exports of citrus from Florida
and motorcycles from Illinois. 3 ' Measures like these will force voters
to choose between a protectionist policy plus sanctions or a free trade
policy. This is, in the end, no choice at all, as the employment result
will be the same. This maneuver, in fact, politically insulates the
elected official from the employment-trade debate.
A Political Compromise
The United States can still save face, comply with the WTO
rulings and placate its constituencies. The United States has an
established (though informal) trade-policy cycle, in place since the
Kennedy Administration, which Fred Bergsten of the Institute for
International Economics calls "one step backward, two steps
forward."' 3' In this cycle, the president seeks new international trade
liberalization agreements, but is blocked by specific domestic political
interests. By minimally appeasing the interest groups to obtain
Congressional authority for trade negotiation, the administration
129. Stokes, supra note 91.
130. Id. These sanctions are for non-compliance with other, earlier decisions of
the Appellate Body. The strategy behind the sanctions, however, may be used for
any trade issue.
131. C. Fred Bergsten, A Renaissance for U.S. Trade Policy?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Nov./Dec. 2002, at 86, 92.
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exchanges "protection that is modest and temporary... for
liberalization and international rule-making that is sizeable and
permanent. ', 13 2 Although the passage of the Byrd Amendment and
other steel industry protections were a step back, the passage of
Trade Promotion (Fast-Track) Authority in 2002 is a very large step
forward, as is the recent repeal of the steel tariffs. The presumptive
death of the Doha Round is similarly a step back, but the Byrd
Amendment verdict and threat of sanctions will hopefully be another
propelling event.
Politicians are always captive to domestic interest groups who
vote and contribute money. But voters and donors know that
compromises must occur, and those compromises allow voters to
identify scapegoats other than their elected officials. Robert Hudec
argues that one of the main advantages of an international rule-based
regulatory system like the WTO is that it can insulate a country's
liberal trade policies from domestic protectionist pressures. 33 Under
this theory, domestic lawmakers can make unpopular political
decisions without fear of electoral repercussions by throwing up their
hands and invoking the WTO rules as the binding scapegoat. In the
face of Europe's new targeted sanctioning approach, this is a very real
and politically practical strategy for U.S. politicians. For the United
States to avoid a massive new trade war, it will hopefully use this
strategy to gain a slim majority in Congress to excise the Byrd
Amendment from the trade law. Senator Byrd could vote against it,
of course, but other senators and congressmen could easily use the
WTO and the threat of paralyzing sanctions to placate their
constituencies when voting for its removal.
Hopefully the United States will do the right thing, and either
shepherd the case through the federal courts to get an injunction on
the application of the Byrd Amendment, or devise a political
compromise in the Congress to allow a decisive removal of CDSOA
from the books. Otherwise, much bigger trouble awaits our economy
and our relationship with the world.
132. Id. at 94.
133. Robert Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 10 (1999).
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